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23. Behavioral Labor Economics 
Nathan Berg 
 
Behavioral economics has in recent decades emerged as a prominent set of methodological 
developments that have attracted considerable attention both within and outside the economics 
profession.  The time is therefore auspicious to assess behavioral contributions to particular 
subfields of economics such as labor economics. With empirical validity among its chief 
objectives, one might guess that behavioral economics would have made its clearest mark in 
data-driven subfields such as labor economics. It has been more theoretical subfields, however, 
that have led much of the recent behavioral movement, drawing on laboratory data for its 
empirical basis as opposed to the large panels of field observations common in labor economics. 
Motivated in part by the question of why labor economics has been a relatively slow 
adopter of behavioral theory, this essay surveys a wide range of behavioral studies that address 
core labor issues. The objective of the survey is to construct a map of areas within labor 
economics in where behavioral methods have already produced new insights, in hopes that the 
existing literature (and the gaps therein) will suggest new directions for future applications of 
behavioral concepts. Comparison and contrast of neoclassical versus behavioral methods and the 
consequences of those methodological differences provide the map’s relief, bringing high and 
low points of the current labor literature’s coverage into sharper focus. 
One finding of this survey worth pointing out at the outset is that, rather than two disjoint 
bodies of work, the relationship between behavioral and neoclassical economics appears to be 
that of superset and subset. Instead of rejecting neoclassical concepts such as self-interest, 
maximization, and equilibrium, behavioral economists’ methodological agenda proves to be one 
of expansion and generalization. This suggests a possible explanation for why the influence of 
behavioral economics in labor economics has been less dramatic than in other subfields. It seems 
that neoclassical practitioners in labor economics have been unusually frank in exposing the 
empirical problems with standard labor market theory and unusually creative in considering the 
complexity of labor market decisions and their psychological dimensions.; Therefore, the gap 
between traditional and behavioral labor economics ies is less dramatic than in other subfields of 
economics. Thus, the survey aims to describe contrasts between behavioral and neoclassical 
approaches to labor economics while revealing how fuzzy the boundary separating the two 
actually is. Kaufman (1989, 1999) in his essays on the behavioral foundations of labor 
economics similarly argues that the behavioral approach is, in principle, an expansion upon 
rather than a departure from the psychological foundations of neoclassical economics. In 
practice, however, the behavioral/neoclassical distinction represents a real boundary. In spite of 
abundant evidence that psychological factors play a critical role in labor market decisions, 
Kaufman reports that only two papers in the Journal of Labor Economics from 1992 to 1997 
adopted expanded or modified models of man that considered psychological processes (i.e., 
models that include decision-making elements other than narrow self-interest, maximization, and 
fixed preferences). 
Regarding the fixity of preferences, Kaufman acknowledges the concern of Gary Becker 
that models that admit psychological complexity and preference change run the risk of 
overexplaining observed economic decision making. Kaufman illustrates his counterposition in 
favor of dynamic preferences with the much studied problem of explaining the reduction of 
annual work hours in the United States over the period 1900–1980. The neoclassical explanation 
for this pattern is that a large income effect in response to rising real wages resulted in increased 
consumption of leisure and fewer hours on the job. The fixed preference paradigm posits that the 
average worker in 1900 would have made the same labor/leisure choice as today’s average 
worker if the real wage in 1900 had been what it is today. Since 1980, however, the trend has 
reversed. The real wage in the United States has continued to rise but annual hours on the job 
have increased. If the neoclassical story has trouble matching the facts, Kaufman asks, why not 
consider cultural, sociological, and psychological variables, including hypotheses that link 
observed patterns to systematic changes in preferences? Of course the validity of new 
explanations is not immediately obvious, and subjecting them to empirical and theoretical tests is 
an important part of the behavioral agenda. The point, however, is that in addition to falsifying 
existing theories there is a role in economic science for the synthesis of new ideas. 
The collection of material reviewed below focuses broadly on behavioral studies that 
adopt models of man consistent with the recommendations in the Kaufman essays. The survey 
provides cause for optimism that attempted realism is worth its cost in terms of forgone 
theoretical parsimony. In fact, the price of realism is quite low when the next best alternative 
fails to deliver the predictive power positivists claim in favor of as-if theory. When the price is as 
low—as it is, for example, in the case of the falsified income-effect explanation of labor-supply 
trends in the United States—it is easy to predict that consumers of economic thought will 
increasingly buy behavioral in years to come. 
The survey is divided into sections covering worker effort, labor supply and income tax 
policy, heterogeneity in labor markets, reciprocity and trust, and finally labor contracts, unions, 
and the scheduling of work. The last section summarizes the resulting map of behavioral labor 
economics and suggests five priorities for future research. 
 
Effort 
 
It is common in neoclassical economics to assume that effort is constant, and therefore that the 
cost of employing a particular quantity of effective labor is linear in time spent on the job. The 
assumption that effort is impervious to physical weariness, opportunities to find work elsewhere, 
the wages of other workers, and even the absolute level of the worker’s own real wage derives 
from an analogy based on physical capital. This analogy supports the constant-effort assumption 
by noticing, for instance, that a well-functioning meat grinder’s capacity to transform inputs into 
outputs does not vary in its second versus ninth hour of use, with the machine’s price, or with 
management’s decisions about whether and for how much to rent other machines. 
Were it easy to observe, monitor, and measure effort, we might expect firms to contract 
with workers for levels of effort in addition to quantities of labor hours. Alternatively, one might 
argue that the widespread practice of paying wages in exchange for time, with effort levels left 
unspecified, implies that approximation error resulting from the constant-effort assumption is 
minor relative to the costs of quantifying and contracting for effort. However, to Adam Smith, 
the variable nature of effort was important enough to write, “Where wages are high, accordingly, 
we shall always find the workmen more active, diligent, and expeditious, than where they are 
low” (quoted in Altman 1999a). Evidently Smith saw some psychological regularity underlying 
workers’ supply of variable effort. 
Arguing in favor of building richer psychological content into economic models, some 
have since wondered whether the economists of Smith’s day understood human psychology 
better than economists do today (Gilad and Kaish 1986; Lewin and Strauss 1988; Schwartz 
2002). The articles reviewed in this section are based on the premise that the constant-effort 
hypothesis is incomplete, and that by studying the determinants of variable effort, new insights 
into the real-world practices of firms and their employment of labor may emerge. 
 
Efficiency Wages, Psychology, and Unemployment 
 
The efficiency wage models of the 1980s reintroduced to mainstream economics the idea of an 
effort function that depends on real wages. This modification fit within an otherwise neoclassical 
framework of maximization and competition while producing involuntary unemployment as an 
equilibrium outcome. Motivated largely by the failure of neoclassical macroeconomic models to 
satisfactorily explain real wage rigidity in the United States and elsewhere, some economists 
turned to more complicated models of the psychology of work, models that implied variable 
levels of effort (Akerlof 1982; Shapiro and Stiglitz 1984). 
Assuming that effort increases as a function of the real wage, with convex and then 
concave regions, there exists a unique point on the effort curve that maximizes effort per dollar 
of real wage. Under quite general conditions, profit maximization implies that firms choose that 
point, referred to as the efficiency wage. Thus, firms choose to pay the efficiency wage no matter 
what labor supply conditions are, and the wage gets stuck there, above the level that would 
otherwise clear the labor market. 
The basic efficiency wage model implies that, so long as the effort curve is fixed, the real 
wage paid by firms is absolutely rigid and does adjust downward during recessions or when there 
is excess labor supply. The reason that unemployed workers cannot bid the wage down is that 
firms, although they would be happier to pay less when hiring additional workers, anticipate 
higher costs associated with shirking, the result of reduced effort in response to a lower wage. 
Because the efficiency wage already optimally trades off the savings of shirking costs against 
additional cash wage outlays, agreeing to low-wage offers by unemployed workers is 
unattractive to firms: the costs of increased shirking outweigh the savings on wages. 
The psychology underlying effort curves reflects assumptions about worker motivation 
and the need for there to be a noticeable gap between workers’ satisfaction with their jobs and 
being unemployed. Otherwise the threat of dismissal is ineffective in eliciting effort, according 
to efficiency wage theory. At lower wages, workers are nearly indifferent between working and 
being unemployed, and therefore have little incentive to work hard. Workers may also feel the 
wage is unfair if it is perceived as being low relative to wage expectations, providing a rationale 
for firms to fire workers instead of lowering wages, in an effort to preserve high levels of effort 
among the employed. In contrast, at higher wages, the psychology of gift exchange becomes 
relevant, as workers supply additional effort to reciprocate for the employer’s willingness to pay 
more than the minimum possible. 
Critics have pointed to flaws in the efficiency wage theory having to do with its 
incomplete account of effort and firms’ strategies in eliciting the desired level of it. Carlin (1989) 
observes that many firms permit certain forms of shirking without firing workers. Carlin points 
out that firing can be costly and that the degree of shirking varies across firms, variation that is 
not adequately explained by efficiency wage theory. In his game theoretic model of effort supply 
and incentive design on the part of firms, asymmetric information is required to deter shirking, 
implying that workers’ uncertainty about the consequences of shirking may be an important part 
of what motivates them. 
Other critics suggest that maximizing effort per dollar of wages may not be a wise 
objective for firms. Assuming workers derive positive utility from shirking, permissive 
managerial stances can serve as a cheaper alternative to cash compensation. Another reason why 
firms may find it in their interest to allow workers the discretion to shirk is that doing so provides 
the firm with valuable information. Observing who among workers shirks and who voluntarily 
exhibits discipline can help guide promotion decisions, especially in identifying prospects for 
future managerial positions (Ireland 1989). 
Apart from the theoretical possibility that positive levels of shirking serve a useful 
economic function, analysts with direct evidence of worker-firm relations and the wage-setting 
process raise doubts as to whether shirking is an important consideration in the first place. In 
U.S. and Swedish samples of managers and labor negotiators, shirking rarely surfaces as a major 
concern (Bewley 1999; Agell and Lundborg 2003). Instead, these studies point to factors such as 
workplace morale and the psychological dynamics of discouragement and unemployment as the 
relevant considerations for those directly responsible for setting wages. 
Research with a more explicitly psychological bent has uncovered interesting patterns 
among psychometric measures of workers’ mental states and objective measures of productivity. 
Such work has led to more intricate theories of unemployment in which psychological well-
being and joblessness are endogenously determined (Darity and Goldsmith 1996). The basic idea 
is that unemployment hurts workers’ productivity. Lower aggregate productivity, in turn, 
depresses labor demand, which, in a self-reinforcing cycle, begets further unemployment. The 
process by which unemployment damages a worker’s psychological well-being can be 
differentiated by psychometric criteria into categories such as self-esteem, learned helplessness, 
loss of practice and skills, and depression (Feather 1990; Goldsmith and Darity 1992; Korpi 
1997). 
The dynamics of employment and psychological well-being imply that path dependence 
and multiple equilibria are important to consider. For example, when a severe spell of 
unemployment leads to psychological depression, from that point on, future bouts of 
psychological depression are more likely, even if future economic downturns are less severe, 
because the availability of depressive episodes in the brain’s memory heightens susceptibility to 
its recurrence. Thus, steady-state levels of unemployment and psychological distress are tied to 
history, and the contrast between low-employment/high-mental-health equilibria and inferior 
equilibria featuring high unemployment is stark. 
The Darity and Goldsmith perspective advocates that labor economics rely more on 
quantitative attitude measures. Their emphasis on psychological health brings out implications 
that contrast sharply with the assumptions of efficiency wage theory. In efficiency wage theory, 
the threat of dismissal is a primary motivator that leads employees to supply high levels of effort. 
(Recall that, according to efficiency wage theory, firms are hypothesized to set wages above the 
market-clearing level so that the opportunity cost of job loss is high enough to induce high 
effort.) In contrast, Darity and Goldsmith’s work cautions that the threat of unemployment is 
itself a stressful event, one that can potentially reduce productivity. While acknowledging that 
fears of job loss may motivate some workers to provide additional effort, Darity and Goldsmith 
emphasize instead that on-the-job effort can be compromised when workers spend effort seeking 
alternative employment opportunities, experience “survivor guilt” following a round of layoffs, 
or suffer from poor concentration as a result of the emotional toll of job insecurity. 
Another implication of the hypothesis that unemployment harms worker productivity is 
that employers may rationally use a worker’s unemployment history as a basis for predicting 
productivity and making hiring decisions. This points to yet another theoretical cause of 
hysterisis. A bout of unemployment shrinks the pool of workers with unbroken employment 
histories, and therefore shrinks the pool of workers regarded as having desirable work histories. 
Thus, unemployment itself reduces the supply of desirable workers, reducing the number of 
hires, leading to another round of increased unemployment. The idea that employers take cues 
from workers’ employment histories also implies the existence of multiple equilibria. High-
employment, high-output steady states are possible, just as low-employment, low-output steady 
states are. Thus, there is scope for policy to intervene and guide the economy away from less 
desirable paths. Path dependence and the multiplicity of equilibria, in many economists’ eyes, 
provide a rationale for policies aimed at reducing unemployment and maintaining the 
psychological health of the temporarily unemployed. 
Gender asymmetries are another consideration in analyzing the gap between wages and 
levels of effort. Those who study the well-documented male marriage premium, widely reported 
in the empirical labor literature, suggest that the anomalous premium may actually serve to 
compensate spouses who supply productivity-enhancing inputs that improve the husband’s 
performance at work (Grossbard-Shechtman 1986). Another behavioral hypothesis relating to 
marriage is that firms value certain “virtues” that they believe are positively correlated with 
marital status (Grossbard-Shechtman 1988). Students of gender issues in the workplace have, 
however, found surprising uniformity across male and female workers in survey-based measures 
of workplace stress and other attitudinal variables (Allen and Fry 1987). If wage asymmetries 
involving gender and marriage could be explained in terms of productivity, then one might 
expect to see these asymmetries reflected in survey data measuring stress, intensity of work, and 
attitudes toward employers. 
The economics of effort literature has also investigated the concept of stress and the 
possibility that excessive effort causes problems for workers and their employers. Although 
high-stakes incentive structures can temporarily boost output by eliciting “workaholic” behavior 
from employees, such structures frequently prove to be unsustainable, ending in costly burnouts 
and highly uncooperative worker dispositions (Camerer 1998). Although there is abundant 
evidence that increased rewards do indeed elicit greater effort, the efficacy of effort becomes 
problematic when effort is taken to excess, as when athletes “overthink” their actions and choke 
under pressure, or when performance-based rewards, such as bonuses or sales competitions, 
wind up harming morale because they are perceived as unfair (Wiesenfeld and Brockner 1998). 
Employing an otherwise neoclassical framework, Kantarelis (forthcoming) shows that 
maximizing profit and maximizing output are conflicting goals. The profit-maximizing level of 
workplace stress is, as one would expect, less than the level that maximizes output. Screening for 
stress and labeling it as an affliction can itself cause stress, leading to higher levels of 
absenteeism (Westman and Gafni 1988). 
Another question regarding the economic analysis of stress is whether it should be 
explicitly included in cost-benefit studies of project proposals in both private industry and the 
public sphere. Although cost-benefit studies rarely attempt to account for psychic costs of stress 
and the resulting dollar costs arising from its physiological manifestations, Schechter (1988) 
makes the case that psychic costs of stress and anxiety should be explicitly figured into studies of 
certain environmental impact studies. Although this debate is relatively recent, and far from 
being resolved, there is at least some consensus on the characteristics of risk that consumers and 
workers find most distressing: those that are involuntary, are uncontrollable, or have delayed 
consequences (Pieters and Verplanken 1988). 
 
X-Efficiency 
 
Effort variability and the interdependency of workers’ effort supply are central components of 
Harvey Leibenstein’s theory of X-efficiency (Leibenstein 1986; Altman 1992). Because workers 
dislike being monitored by managers and tend to respond to the distrust it signals by shirking 
(i.e., supplying a lower level of effort along any dimension over which the worker enjoys 
discretion), there is scope for a mutually beneficial exchange: reduced monitoring in return for 
higher voluntary levels of effort. According to X-efficiency theory, as monitoring and sanctions 
against low-effort behavior increase, two opposing results follow. First, the minimum feasible 
level of effort (chosen by workers with antagonistic feelings toward management or other 
reasons to shirk) rises because the threshold at which monitors intervene and sanctions go into 
effect is set to be more sensitive to shirking. All else equal, this pushes workers to supply 
increased levels of effort. The second result, which pushes worker behavior in the opposite 
direction, is a decrease in voluntary effort chosen by workers from within their discretionary 
bounds. This is a reciprocal response to managers who signal distrust by stepping up monitoring, 
delegating less, and restricting the range of discretion in employee hands. 
According to Leibenstein, most workers do not bump up against workplace sanctions 
frequently enough to be fully aware of what they are or where the thresholds lie that trigger 
disciplinary responses from management. Another aspect of Leibenstein’s framework is the 
general idea of inertia within bounds combined with discrete responses at the boundaries. In 
terms of worker behavior, this means there is typically a wide range of effort levels over which 
no response from management is forthcoming—no change in wage, no disciplinary response, no 
feedback at all. Thus, factors such as the attitudes of other workers and the degree to which 
participatory modes of decision making are implemented as workplace norms determine whether 
high or low levels of effort are chosen from within workers’ discretionary bounds. 
Leibenstein and other analysts of X-efficiency emphasize the importance of interaction 
between patterns of production and worker morale, suggesting that conventional measures of 
economic efficiency fail to identify unrealized opportunities for both higher wages and increased 
output per wage dollar. Whenever a given level of effort at a given level of monitoring could be 
supplied voluntarily under an alternative managerial policy, the firm has not attained X-
efficiency. In effect, there is a prisoner’s dilemma in which high monitoring and low effort are 
the dominant strategies. According to Leibenstein, the individually rational yet collectively 
unwise Nash equilibrium can be improved upon by means of consensual procedures and effort 
conventions that attain high-effort, high-wage/good-work-condition outcomes. 
Although Leibenstein tied X-inefficiency to market imperfections, which allow firms 
with suboptimal management to survive, subsequent research has shown that even under perfect 
competition, X-efficiency is not guaranteed so long as effort is a function of the real wage 
(Altman 1996). That competition fails to ensure X-efficiency poses an important problem for 
studies of labor market discrimination. Given X-inefficiency, lower pay that was caused by 
discriminatory animus will at some point lead to lower productivity. At that point, disentangling 
discrimination from productivity differentials becomes more complicated. 
Neoclassical discrimination studies, based on the premise that the expected wage function 
in a discrimination-free environment should depend exclusively on factors tied to worker 
productivity, may fail to detect discriminatory outcomes (Altman 1995). The discriminated-
against worker who responds to an unfairly low wage by withholding effort appears to be paid 
fairly when viewed through the neoclassical lens. 
Frantz (1986) provides empirical evidence of widespread X-inefficiency. He describes a 
psychological basis in terms of id and ego for the quadratic-shaped relationship between 
managerial pressure and effort/performance. Sometimes referred to as the Yerkes-Dodson law in 
psychology, the arc-shaped relationship between pressure and performance is a key implication 
of X-efficiency theory. 
Organizational theory takes on added importance within the X-efficiency framework. If 
particular patterns of work and managerial techniques elicit higher effort with lower monitoring 
costs, then one would hope for a prescriptive theory explaining how to organize production and 
create high-effort X-efficient firms. Empirical studies of work structure and managerial practices 
reveal a surprising degree of variation, even among longtime rivals in competitive industries 
(Altman 2002). This suggests that competition does not necessarily produce convergence across 
firms in the structure and style of work. Either there exist many profit-maximizing management 
strategies or X-inefficiency is a common problem that is difficult for owners and managers of 
firms to solve. 
A number of essays have been published with prescriptive recommendations aimed at 
achieving X-efficiency. Recommendations have focused on areas such as effort-augmenting 
organizational capital (Tomer 1986), recruitment and job redesign (Filer 1986), the interface 
between workers and the acquisition of new physical capital (Evangelista 1996), and techniques 
for improving relations among workers (Frantz and Green 1982). Policies intended to improve 
working conditions have also been analyzed in connection with X-efficiency, as a means for 
enabling firms to switch away from low-effort/low-wage equilibria to superior high-wage/high-
effort outcomes. Such policies include minimum wage legislation (Altman 1992), restrictions on 
child labor (Altman 2001a), and expanded negotiating rights for organized labor (Altman 2000). 
The potential for these interventions to help the economy achieve a superior equilibrium follows 
from the multiple-equilibria implication of X-efficiency theory. In contrast, the single-
equilibrium neoclassical approach almost always concludes that these same policies are 
inefficient, at least by the Pareto criterion. 
 
Relative Position 
 
One of the most widely discussed issues at the frontier of labor economics is social hierarchy and 
the role that coworkers’ incomes play in determining a worker’s satisfaction with his or her own 
income. More and more economists accept the idea, for example, that workers typically would 
prefer to earn $90,000 at a firm where the average worker earns $50,000 over a salary of 
$100,000 at a firm where the average is $200,000. Frank (1987) refers to goods such as labor 
income, whose relative quantities, in addition to absolute levels, affect utility, as positional 
goods. By specifying preferences with utility representations that depend on the consumption 
levels of others, as well as one’s own consumption, Frank’s generalization of the neoclassical 
utility framework formalizes an idea found in Duesenberry (1949), Veblen (1899), and Adam 
Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments: that social hierarchy is a crucial element that any general 
theory of choice must address. 
The notion of other-regarding preferences leading individuals to seek relative position in 
hierarchical systems can be justified in evolutionary terms, as a hardwired feature of human 
decision making (Gintis 2000), or as the result of competitive pressures in present-day decision-
making contexts such as the mutual fund industry (Berg and Lien 2003). Complementing such 
theoretical arguments that seek to provide a rationale for the prevalence of other-regarding 
preferences, the psychological literature on motivation provides abundant experimental evidence 
in support of the idea that relative consumption can be just as important as absolute consumption 
(Baxter 1988). Lazear’s (1995) Personnel Economics, while critical of Frank’s theory of 
positional goods, develops innovative arguments more closely rooted in neoclassical theories of 
asymmetric information and commitment problems in strategic settings, ultimately arriving at 
similar conclusions: that economics must take account of emotions and relative comparisons in 
order to understand many important features of contemporary labor markets. 
Clearly, more empirical detail is needed to disentangle the many determinants of effort. 
Extant empirical work in this area verifies that effort and productivity are indeed highly variable, 
even over short stretches of time when wages are fixed (Boddy, Frantz, and Poe-Tierney 1986; 
Filer 1987). It is also well established that quantitative attitude measures help explain variation in 
effort (Norsworthy and Zabala 1990) and that effort supply rests on a deep sociological 
foundation (Akerlof and Yellen 1990). Innovation in the measurement and empirical analysis of 
effort will almost surely continue as a focus in behavioral labor economics. 
 
Labor Supply, Incentives, and Taxes 
 
Behavioral Analyses of Labor Supply 
 
One of the most famous of recent labor-supply findings concerns New York City cab drivers 
(Camerer et al. 1997), who reportedly work fewer hours on days when customers are plentiful 
and longer when paying customers are difficult to find. This pattern of behavior implies that 
cabbies’ daily supply of hours is negatively correlated with their wage, the return on an hour 
spent in the cab. Because cab drivers choose their own hours, and day-to-day wages are 
transitory rather than permanent (the result of factors such as weather, the scheduling of 
conventions, and subway breakdowns), the cab driver data appear to offer a clean test of whether 
intertemporal substitution decisions adhere to standard life-cycle theory. 
The standard theory predicts that as long as a worker’s time horizon is longer than a day, 
workers should work longer on high-wage days and rest when the cash wages forgone are low, 
that is, on slow days. New York City cab drivers’ behavior is inconsistent with that prediction. 
Instead, their behavior appears to be consistent with a one-day time horizon and a simple 
income-targeting rule: work until the daily earnings target is reached and then stop. Subsequent 
work has questioned the income-targeting interpretation of the cab driver data, raising the 
possibility that other factors better account for the negative wage-hours correlation, including 
errors in reported hours or physiological constraints (Fehr and Goette 2002; Farber 2003). 
Nevertheless, strong psychological evidence in favor of reference points and the bracketing of 
decision problems into smaller units (e.g., focusing on daily rather than weekly or lifetime 
earnings) makes plausible the income-targeting hypothesis and helps account for its extensive 
track record in economics (Sharir 1976; Altman 2001b). 
Another prominent instance of economists drawing on experimental evidence rooted in 
the psychology literature to put forth an alternative model of decision making is the concept of 
loss aversion. Loss aversion is a preference specification in which a particular reference-point 
level of consumption plays a dominant role. Relative to the reference point, a one-unit reduction 
in consumption generates loss of utility with a magnitude that exceeds the utility gain from a 
one-unit increase. Thus, the utility function, an increasing function of consumption as in standard 
utility models, is kinked, and its slope is flatter to the right of the kink. In addition, loss-aversion 
theory frequently assumes risk-loving behavior over losses, implying convexity to the left of the 
kink, and risk aversion, or concavity, to the right. The loss-aversion utility specification is based 
on the observation that decision makers who exhibit risk aversion over positive outcomes often 
prefer to gamble over negative outcomes rather than accept a certain loss. 
Loss aversion is used to account for a wide variety of apparent anomalies in economics, 
and Dunn (1996) applies it to explain the puzzling observation that many workers choose to 
work just until overtime pay rates are about to start, quitting for the day just when wage rates 
jump to higher overtime levels. This behavior appears to be inconsistent with standard 
neoclassical models of labor supply, which imply that workers work up to the point where the 
wage just offsets the marginal disutility of the last hour or minute of work. Assuming that 
disutility of work (frequently assumed to equal the utility of leisure) is twice differentiable, then 
the marginal disutility of work should increase smoothly and no discrete jumps in the worker’s 
psychic costs of work are possible. 
Under these assumptions, the observed stopping behavior does not make sense. Because 
the worker agrees to work the last hour at the lower regular wage, we infer that the disutility of 
the eighth hour is less than the regular wage. When the worker quits for the day instead of 
working one overtime hour, we infer that the disutility of the ninth hour overwhelms even the 
larger overtime wage in magnitude. This implies a dramatic jump in the disutility of work, 
whereby the psychic cost of the ninth hour is dramatically higher than that of the eighth. But this 
is inconsistent with the smoothness assumptions already made about the utility function. 
Thus, with neoclassical smoothness assumptions in place, the observed behavior is not 
rational. However, assuming that the relevant reference point is the eight-hour workday, then the 
kinked utility function implied by loss-averse preferences is consistent with observation. 
Accepting the regular wage to work the eighth hour while refusing a higher overtime wage for 
the ninth hour is consistent because the utility-of-consumption function is relatively flat to the 
right of the eight-hour-day reference-point level of consumption, effectively discounting the 
value of additional consumption financed with the higher overtime wage. 
Animal studies have explored a number of behavioral hypotheses about labor supply and 
the theory of choice (Kagel, Battalio, and Green 1995), discovering remarkable consistency with 
reported findings in human populations. Income-compensated variations in relative prices 
demonstrate negative substitution effects. And in terms of labor supply, strong income effects 
give rise to rapidly backward-bending labor supply curves. Violations of the expected utility 
axioms have been reported, as well as evidence consistent with loss-averse preferences. 
As alluded to in the introduction, behavioral economists looking at labor supply trends 
through time have identified problems with neoclassical explanations of fluctuations in the level 
of employment. Standard explanations for such trends typically rely on factors such as 
population size, the real wage, human capital, and fertility trends. Behavioral research has 
expanded upon such analyses by considering macro-level cultural trends and the possibility of 
preference change. For example, Altman (1999b) attributes the shortening of the workweek in 
Canada from 1880 to 1930 to shifting preferences. And Romme (1990), analyzing increasing 
trends in the labor supply of females in Holland, explicitly rejects the connection between real 
wage and labor supply in favor of cultural variables and dynamic preferences. 
Another segment of the labor supply literature working to extend neoclassical models to 
include a wider set of behavioral variables is that focused on the problem of estimating wage 
premiums associated with risky jobs. One goal related to this problem is to decompose the wages 
of occupations such as firefighters, pilots, and waste disposal personnel into separate terms 
reflecting human capital and compensation for bearing risk. Such studies require a delicate 
quantification of risks, however, which has forced economists to conceive of risk in greater detail 
than the traditional risk-is-variance approach would suggest. Whether risks are voluntary, 
controllable, or delayed registers strongly with most workers’ preferences. Saliency also plays a 
role, wherein easy-to-conjure or highly vivid risks (such as airplane crashes) are overweighted 
relative to the prescriptions of expected utility theory. Small risks that may seem less dramatic 
(such as skin cancer due to sun exposure) also appear to be systematically underweighted. Reber, 
Wallin, and Chhokar (1984) attempt to apply these results and produce behaviorally informed 
normative guidelines aimed at helping modify workplace behavior and improve safety. 
Although many interesting empirical estimates have emerged regarding workplace risks 
and compensation, there is considerable pessimism about their reliability because of numerous 
auxiliary assumptions that are required (Dickens 1990). Hedonic wage regressions that use 
human capital controls to absorb variation due to nonrisk factors rest on the assumption that 
wage data are observed in states of competitive equilibrium and that the risk factors are correctly 
(i.e., rationally) priced. Lack of competition in labor markets, together with the difficulty 
workers face in learning about possible negative outcomes and their rare-event distributions, 
make it unlikely that job-risk coefficients from wage regressions have the desired interpretation, 
as willingness-to-pay for risk avoidance. 
 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation 
 
Perceptions of and attitudes toward risk are fundamental to understanding variation in rates of 
innovation and business creation. Thus, behavioral economics has a comparative advantage in 
studying entrepreneurship. The study of innovation and entrepreneurship from a behavioral 
perspective has much in common with the economic subfield of Austrian-school analysis and the 
intellectual tradition of Schumpeter and Hayek (Gilad, Kaish, and Ronen 1988). Shared 
priorities, aimed at relaxing the neoclassical methodological norms of perfect rationality and 
equilibrium, bring together a remarkably wide range of political orientations under the umbrella 
of behavioral economics (Berg 2003). It should not be surprising, however, that ideology and 
political orientation recede as secondary concerns in behavioral economics, which touts 
empiricism as its unifying theme. 
The Schumpeterian tradition asserts that economics can produce analytical insights 
without the assumptions of maximization and equilibrium (Helmstadter and Perlman 1996), 
focusing instead on expectation formation and the creative process underlying the synthesis of 
new ideas, products, and firms. This Austrian-style behavioral literature analyzes a number of 
interesting policy debates that hinge on the question of economic rewards, the disincentivizing 
effects of redistribution using income taxes, and the social disruptiveness of technological 
innovation. Shen’s (1996) Schumpeterian simulation study illustrates these points, defying 
ideological tradition by finding that a progressive income tax, which discourages entrepreneurial 
activity to a certain degree by lowering the return on risk taking, may be socially optimal. 
The study of innovation in behavioral economics overlaps with the analysis of how firms 
are managed and the search for organizational schemes that nurture creativity, discoveries, and 
economic growth. In this spirit, Schwartz (1987), based on in-depth interviews, provides 
prescriptive guidelines for managers to help reduce inefficiency resulting from decision-making 
pitfalls such as failing to gather technological information, unreasonable resistance to change, 
nominal/real interest rate confusion, overreliance on outsourcing, and unfounded assumptions 
about quality-price correlation when purchasing inputs. Drawing on multiple methodological 
traditions, Langowitz (1991) constructs a complementary list of organizational suggestions 
focused on improving interactions between firms and their workers. And O’Higgins (1988) 
documents the importance of matching managers to particular kinds of tasks according to their 
relative strengths in entrepreneurial thinking versus cost-minimizing analysis. 
 
Taxes and Income Redistribution 
 
Income tax policy is a controversial topic, in part because difficult-to-verify behavioral 
assumptions deeply affect the conclusions and policy implications of competing theoretical 
models, especially models of labor supply and savings decisions. The relationship between labor 
supply and marginal income tax rates is crucial in analyzing how income taxes affect economic 
output. In the tax policy literature, the label “behavioral” is often used to signify simply that a 
particular model allows for labor supply adjustment in response to changes in tax rates (Duncan 
and Weeks 1997). 
As far as the empirical record goes, correlations and structural estimates of labor supply 
elasticities with respect to income tax rates are notably small. According to Krueger (2003), the 
best estimates from the vast labor supply literature imply that a tax cut that raises take-home 
income by 10 percent would expand labor supply by only 1 percent among men and 3 percent 
among women. Such small magnitudes rule out (Hausman and Poterba 1987) the claims by some 
that tax cuts would pay for themselves, at least through the labor supply channel. 
Behavioral tax analyses tend to bring in additional empirical detail often suppressed in 
representative-consumer neoclassical studies of tax policy and taxpayer behavior. Apps and Rees 
(1996) find that introducing household production and intrafamily welfare distributions can 
reverse the policy implications of empirical income tax studies. Thus, the requirements that 
members of households have identical objectives and that consumption is distributed evenly 
within the household are not innocent assumptions. 
Another assumption that substantively influences conclusions about optimal tax and 
income-redistribution policies concerns whether workers’ labor supply responses take the form 
of adjustment along the extensive (entering the labor force or not) or intensive (adjusting effort 
or hours of work) margin. When labor force participation is the dominant mode of response, the 
optimal policy, according to Saez (2002), is one that provides a low level of guaranteed income 
and negative income tax rates over low income levels, as with the earned income tax credit. 
When effort/hours adjustment is more pronounced, however, the preferred policy provides a 
larger minimum level of income and a more rapid phasing out of transfers as income increases. 
Another tax-related topic of interest to behavioral economics is charitable giving and the 
interaction of altruistic sentiments and tax policy. Although some policy analysts have expressed 
optimism that tax incentives might be used to stimulate private charitable giving and reduce 
government transfers without reducing overall support for the needy, Barrett, McGuirk, and 
Steinberg (1997) estimate that reducing taxes on charitable giving by $1 raises charitable giving 
by only 40 cents. 
Another behavioral question about income redistribution concerns non-labor-supply 
responses to income maintenance programs. In an overview of reported outcomes from income 
maintenance experiments in the United States, Hanushek (1986) provides several encouraging 
observations. He finds that children of transfer recipients spend less time at work and more time 
studying. Also, based on comparisons of average consumption before and after transfer programs 
were begun, it does not appear that recipient families binge on extra consumption, as some 
feared they might. 
 
Worker Heterogeneity 
 
Part of what makes behavioral economics stand apart from the neoclassical approach is its 
interest in describing the particularity of special groups. Deviations from the average become the 
object of study rather than a nuisance to be dispensed with en route to the application of 
representative agent theory. Thus, descriptive studies detailing heterogeneity and its 
consequences enjoy a well-established home in the behavioral literature. In contemplating the 
underlying causes of heterogeneity, it is interesting to consider the tremendous variation in 
preferences reported in animal studies, e.g., taste for income, or risk aversion—despite strict 
laboratory controls over gene pools and environmental conditions (Kagel, Battalio, and Green 
1995). 
Descriptive labor studies are common to behavioral economics, sociology, and other 
disciplines within the social sciences. Beyond common demographic categories such as race, 
gender, age, and geography, the behavioral labor literature provides comparative descriptions of 
other kinds of special groups as well, sometimes based on distinct types of preferences, disease 
(Kahn 1998), or job type (Sorenson 1990). Gender is an especially important and frequently 
analyzed dimension of heterogeneity. 
 
Gender 
 
There is a strong link between behavioral economists’ analyses of gender and neoclassical 
studies of household behavior, both of which deal with the problem of aggregating the choices of 
household members and the possibility of conflicting interests within households. Stiglitz’s 
(1988) analysis of productivity differences and household decision making demonstrates that 
gender can be brought into the neoclassical framework while maintaining assumptions such as 
negative marginal utility of effort, constant preferences, and the fixity of cultural and 
sociological norms. Phipps and Burton (1995), on the other hand, critique the limitations of 
neoclassical household analysis, preferring instead to quantify social/institutional variables that 
describe cross-country heterogeneity, checking observed correlations against reduced-form 
implications from more complex theoretical models. 
Empirical research into gender heterogeneity points to the importance of jointly 
specifying labor supply and fertility decisions (Di Tommaso and Weeks 2000) in econometric 
studies of female labor supply. Another complication is that couples do not make labor supply 
decisions independently. One component of the joint labor supply problem is scheduling work so 
that leisure hours overlap, which imposes constraints on the jobs and hours couples choose 
(Chenu and Robinson 2002). Case studies of executives and other relatively successful workers 
at a particular rank and level of income reveal that female career trajectories into leadership roles 
are noticeably different, in general requiring more time, on-the-job experience, and family 
sacrifices from women (Martin and Morgan 1995). 
Unequal distribution of consumption within the household gives rise to another kind of 
gender asymmetry, one that can make real household income a poor measure of household well-
being (Altman and Lamontagne 2003). Women in households with highly unequal distributions 
may be relatively deprived, despite belonging to a well-off household. Thus, without knowledge 
of within-household distributions of resources, measurement of well-being requires consumption 
data disaggregated from the household down to the individual level. 
 
Explaining Heterogeneity 
 
Beyond describing particular segments of the labor market and their special characteristics, 
behavioral economics is also concerned with the underlying causes of heterogeneity. Henrich 
and colleagues (2001) conduct ultimatum-game experiments in fifteen small-scale societies from 
twelve different countries, uncovering tremendous variety in the degree of reciprocal behavior. 
Rejecting the self-interest/zero-reciprocity model in all groups studied, and noting that individual 
demographic variables fail to explain variation in individual levels of reciprocity, the study 
provides an alternative environmental explanation. Using quantitative measures of the degree to 
which different groups’ techniques of production and patterns of exchange require interaction 
and cooperation, the authors link group-level environmental variables to variation in reciprocity. 
This widely discussed finding implies that the rational self actor model should be enlarged to 
include a moderate degree of reciprocity and that preferences are systematically shaped by 
economic environments rather than exogenously determined. 
Other single-population studies have, in the absence of good data on variation of the 
environment, found that demographic variables such as age, earnings, race, and gender do help 
predict reciprocity, as measured by proposed divisions of the pie and rates of rejection in 
ultimatum game experiments (Eckel and Grossman 2001). Thus, the role of individual 
demographic characteristics in explaining different propensities to reciprocate remains an open 
question. The fascinating issue of explaining preferences in terms of economic environments 
promises to be an area worthy of more investigation, despite the high costs of cross-cultural 
studies such as that of Henrich and colleagues (2001) and the requirement of anthropological 
expertise. 
A variety of other forms of heterogeneity have been studied using conventional 
regression analysis. For example, workers in more competitive industries report higher levels of 
happiness, possibly suggesting that competitive pressures lead firms to improve working 
conditions (Tiemann and Veglahn 1979). In an efficiency study of farmers in India, those who 
are older, own large or geographically fragmented land holdings, or have subsistence needs in 
addition to raising cash crops appear to be less efficient (Ali, Parikh, and Shah 1996). Attempting 
to explain racial/ethnic differences in workers’ propensity to cross picket lines during a strike, 
Gramm and Schnell (1994) find that minority participation in the 1987 National Football League 
strike depended significantly and positively on the minority status of each team’s union 
representative. Explaining why Turkish immigrants choose to immigrate to Germany, Waldorf, 
Esparza, and Huff (1990) report a wide variety of motives, many of which are not financial, 
ranging from perceived lifestyle benefits to the expressed desire to reunite with family members. 
Heterogeneity in entrepreneurs’ closeness to government is documented in a study of 
Israeli entrepreneurs (Lerner 1989), which finds that variables such as risk tolerance, interest in 
foreign trade, and industry type strongly condition the probability of receiving state-subsidized 
capital. And research on heterogeneous preferences and their connection to labor/leisure choices 
(based on differential desires for income) suggests that these sources of variation are correlated 
with marital status (Grossbard-Shechtman and Neuman 1988) and with attitudinal measures of 
“family orientation” (Cappelli, Constantine, and Chadwick 2000). Thus, the marriage premium 
puzzle may be a consequence of heterogeneous preferences, measures of which are generally 
absent in wage regressions, which, because they are correlated with marriage, would therefore 
lead to spurious marriage-on-wage effects. 
 
Social Norms and Trust 
 
One way to model externalities is to include agent i’s consumption in agent j’s utility function. 
This is simply a formalization of the idea that people care about the choices of others, which in 
itself does not imply that they are altruistic or inclined toward reciprocity. A simplification of 
this approach is to specify preferences that, in addition to one’s own consumption, depend on the 
population’s average level of consumption. This framework provides a nice explanation for the 
existence of the modern welfare state. With a small amount of altruism (reflected by positive 
utility from increased levels of average consumption) or risk aversion toward aggregate income 
shocks, Lindbeck (1997) shows that the most preferred tax-transfer policy provides a moderate 
minimum income guarantee using progressive taxation. 
Arguments in favor of other-regarding behavior are by now numerous: a small propensity 
to cooperate can be an adaptive trait that enhances the fitness of groups competing for resources 
(Gintis 2000); in a robust class of evolutionary games, reciprocators who punish those deviating 
from social norms can invade populations of nonreciprocators (Sethi and Somanathan 2001, 
2003); honesty, even when dishonesty is feasible, can increase a firm’s profitability (Cialdini 
1996); and firms with prosocial corporate cultures save on labor costs when hiring workers with 
a particular level of human capital (Frank 1996). The welfare-enhancing role of social norms in 
favor of trust or concern with the least well-off members of the group are documented in small-
scale societies (Onyeiwu 1997; Heinrich et al. 2001), informal credit markets (Yotopoulos and 
Floro 1992), and modern economic environments such as the agribusiness industry (Wilson 
2000). 
Skeptics worry, however, that social norms favoring in-group cooperation may be too 
weak to offset individual gains from non-cooperation while, in other settings, excessive in-group 
cooperation may lead to undesirable forms of discrimination against non-group members.  
Loewenstein (1996) paints an extremely bleak picture for the possibility of managerial altruism. 
He points out that the experimental evidence on altruism suggests that such sentiments are 
typically weak and transient. According to studies he cites, most individuals find it easy to 
discount negative consequences borne by others, especially when there is no face-to-face 
interaction with victims. Loewenstein warns that future reputational benefits, which some have 
suggested might lead to prosocial behavior among firms and managers, tend to be overwhelmed 
by immediate benefits. He cautions that decision-making biases do not seem to self-correct and 
that unequal gains are easily rationalized by the recipients of those gains. The potentially 
discriminatory consequences of favorable in-group sentiment in the labor-market context are 
illustrated by models of reputational cascades (Kuran 1998), social conventions (Kaneko and 
Kimura 1992), and the psychology of “inappropriate helpfulness” (Brewer 1996). 
 
Labor Contracts and the Structure of Work 
 
More than fifty years ago, Simon (1951) posed a fundamental question concerning labor 
contracts: why is it more common that such contracts stipulate the exchange of wages for time 
rather than the completion of a particular task? Simon points out that because workers remain 
interested in how employers use their labor even after work contracts are agreed to, rental 
contracts offer a better, although still imperfect, analogy for labor than do sales contracts. 
Simon’s analysis demonstrates that uncertainty over which actions will be most effective in 
accomplishing the employer’s objectives makes it desirable for the employer to purchase an 
option on the employee’s time rather than contracting for piecework. 
According to Simon’s model, workers have ranges of accepted behaviors that can 
agreeably be asked of them. The more indifferent workers are over the elements within this 
range, the cheaper workers will sell an option on their time (i.e., the lower the wage). Simon 
emphasizes that, apart from the domain of negotiable job characteristics, other elements of work 
remain entirely under the discretion of workers and thus susceptible to varying levels of effort, 
an idea that overlaps with the ideas of Leibenstein described in an earlier section. A wide range 
of economic and multidisciplinary research exists analyzing various aspects of labor contracts 
and the structure of work. The following sections cover areas that stand out in terms of the role 
that behavioral techniques have played in providing new insights, in the tradition of Simon and 
beyond. 
 
Absenteeism, Overtime, and the Structure of the Workweek 
 
Neoclassical analyses suggest that compressing the workweek (e.g., from five eight-hour days to 
four ten-hour days) should reduce absenteeism and discourage workers from taking too many 
high-wage overtime hours. The four-day 40-hour workweek discourages absenteeism because 
the cost of missing a day’s work is ten hours of lost wage income instead of eight. Overtime is 
less attractive with the four-day workweek because the marginal disutility of the eleventh and 
twelfth hours exceeds that of the ninth and tenth hours. Since the psychic cost of overtime is 
higher, due to both physical and mental exhaustion after ten hours on the job, workers are 
predicted to choose less of it (Yaniv 1986). 
Similar cost savings as well as reductions in transportation congestion costs have been 
attributed to the idea of flextime (labor contracts that give employees flexibility in setting their 
own work hours). Although survey evidence suggests that flextime is popular with workers, the 
empirical evidence on its capacity to provide cost savings is weak (Moss and Curtis 1985). 
Golden (1996, 1998) emphasizes that one must consider flows of potential benefits associated 
with time on the job that are not included in the standard neoclassical model in order to 
theoretically model flexibility of hours worked. Golden (2001) reports that access to flexible 
work hours increased dramatically from the mid-1980s through the early 1990s, with nearly one 
in three workers reporting some ability to set their own hours in 1997, but that the increasing 
trend came to a halt, leaving a static, highly nonuniform distribution of access to flexibility 
across job types and worker ethnicity and gender. Behavioralists working with cultural and 
attitudinal measures have suggested links between those variables, workplace flexibility, and 
rates of absenteeism (Kaiser 1998). 
 
Worker Participation and Control 
 
Worker participation in production decisions and control over hours, wages, and other workplace 
issues typically under the purview of managers and corporate boards brings with it both costs 
and benefits. Behavioral economics has devoted considerable attention to the question of how 
those costs and benefits compare and to the normative issue of whether U.S. firms employ an 
optimal mix of worker versus managerial and board control. Tomer (1988) argues that there 
exists a maximally X-efficient participative ideal, that is, an organizational scheme for 
distributing control among workers, owners, and managers. Using this ideal as a benchmark, 
several behavioral analysts conclude that superior organizational schemes are indeed available 
and that firms and perhaps governments should actively promote workplace decentralization, 
promising significant improvements in both profits and workers’ well being (Wiendieck 1988). 
Case studies illustrate the immense potential for innovative control structures to produce 
impressive levels of efficiency. Hattwick’s (1987) study of the Woodward Governor Company 
tells the story of how a one-worker/one-vote democratic decision-making procedure helped that 
company survive the Great Depression. Faced with steep losses, the company asked workers 
whether they preferred layoffs or hours reductions. Workers negotiated and voted on a deal that 
offered reduction to half-time hours in exchange for a commitment to avoid layoffs for as long as 
possible. Managers wound up taking out loans against their personal assets to make good on their 
commitment to avoid layoffs. 
Eventually, Woodward Governor turned profitable again and emerged as a successful 
Fortune 100 firm. The atmosphere of mutual trust and appreciation that came out of those 
challenging times persisted for decades, as did the participatory mode of decision making. As the 
firm grew, decisions such as whether to invest in new production facilities were put to firmwide 
employee votes. Management voluntarily provided health insurance and paid workers to stay 
home when ill, which, managers claimed, helped prevent the spread of illness among workers. In 
designing its pension plan, the firm provided identical retirement packages for all employees, 
from top managers to entry-level employees. The relatively modest pension plan reflected the 
owners’ complex beliefs, which valued self-reliance while rejecting paternalistic or welfare-state 
managerial models, always placing a high value on equality and participation in the decision-
making process. 
Studies of the grievance process through which workers present their requests to 
corporate decision makers demonstrate that differences in management styles consistently 
predict grievance outcomes, with the implication that friendly and participative structures of 
control are better for all parties involved (Bemmels 1994). Skeptics point out, however, that in 
spite of the benefits from worker participation and shared control, worker-controlled firms may 
never be able to compete and gain a foothold in the business world. One important reason for 
such pessimism is the possibility that, because workers generally lack the political connections 
(and perhaps managerial expertise) that owners have, worker-controlled firms may face higher 
borrowing costs. All else equal, unless the benefits of nonstandard control systems offset their 
elevated costs of investment financing, even X-efficiency-superior control systems, may never 
get off the ground (Putterman 1992). 
 
Unions 
 
Walton and McKersie (1991) detail four distinct functions of bargaining in labor negotiations. 
Zero-sum bargaining over wages and other financial benefits is probably the most obvious 
function of unions. However, in addition to adversarial, fixed-pie negotiation, bargaining can 
also serve a so-called integrative function, aimed at increasing mutual benefits and expanding the 
size of the pie. Third, because workers and managers generally care about the worker-manager 
relationship itself and its impact on quality of life during work hours, so-called attitudinal 
bargaining serves to expand nonfinancial benefits stemming from on-the-job social interaction. 
Finally, because there are other stake holders in the outcomes considered in many labor 
negotiations, bargaining sometimes focuses on the interests of third parties, a function referred to 
as intraorganizational. Statistical studies of actual negotiations and outcomes tend to support 
Walton and McKersie’s claim that negotiations have both distributive (zero-sum) and integrative 
components (Peterson and Tracy 1977). 
When put to empirical econometric tests, neoclassical theories of strikes have trouble 
explaining the available data (Freeman 1997). Both theoretical and experimental studies of 
reciprocity (Fehr, Gachter, and Kirchsteiger 1997) suggest that the integrative aspect of 
bargaining, missing from many neoclassical analyses, is an important part of why the standard 
theory on the subject is incomplete. 
Among those patterns that have proven difficult to explain are the following. The mere 
availability of the strike option, restricted by law for some public employees in certain states, 
appears to raise teacher salaries by as much as 10 percent (Delaney 1983). Also, unionized 
workers are more likely to have pension benefits than nonunion workers (Gustman and 
Steinmeier 1986). 
Some analysts suggest, however, that the union/nonunion distinction is fuzzy, with many 
unionlike options, such as slowdowns and sabotage, available to nonunion workers as well 
(Ulman 1990). In explaining the strengthening and subsequent decline of union strength in the 
United States, Piore (1995) argues that cultural trends, social forces, and collective emotions are 
the most important causes. Debate about the functions and consequences of unions is likely to 
continue. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This survey demonstrates that behavioral labor economics is pursing a path of generalization 
rather than revolution. In many instances, its methods include or overlap with neoclassical 
methods that deal with the same problems. Concerning the connection between behavioral 
methodology and policy, the studies cited here clearly demonstrate that empiricism trumps 
ideology. Behavioralists show themselves to be empiricists principally, elaborating and testing 
theory based on assumptions that accord with observation. 
Critics sometimes raise the concern that behavioral economics’ openness to the 
possibility of decision-making imperfections also opens the door to theories that favor 
paternalistic economic policy. However, the existence of policies that lead to improvements over 
decentralized markets in no way follows from the existence of decision-making imperfections 
(see Smith 2003). Virtually all the behavioralists whose works are cited above acknowledge this 
point in some way. Some even suggest that the existence of micro-level imperfections 
underscores the need for free markets and competition—to effectively aggregate information, 
make that information public, and coordinate behavior in the absence of centralized control. 
While some papers reported on here call for policy interventions to help steer the economy along 
an improved path, this is by no means the general case. 
The survey documents an impressive accumulation of contributions to long-standing 
labor questions such as fluctuations in real wages, hours worked, the participation rate, and the 
economic impact of labor unions. While these questions will no doubt continue to attract the 
attention of behavioral economics in years to come, five research and data collection priorities 
stand out: (1) better empirical measures of effort and study designs that make effort easier to 
observe, (2) survey data sets that include psychometric measures of mental health and attitudinal 
variables along with traditional labor variables such as earnings, hours, and demographics, (3) 
macro labor models with preference change that make falsifiable predictions, (4) normative 
analysis of the potential for efficiency improvements from greater flexibility in the scheduling of 
work, and (5) anthropological techniques for collecting better descriptive accounts of economic 
environments and the preferences of labor market participants. 
Because behavioral labor is rooted in empiricism, the five priorities listed above 
concentrate on the development of new measures, the collection of new data, and the 
construction of theories with explicit empirical implications. Many of the existing behavioral 
analyses of effort, unemployment, and worker psychology point directly to the need for better 
data. Better data are also required for behavioral theory to prove its worth in the domain of 
policy analysis. The existing literature makes definite strides down that path. Improved data with 
variables designed for testing psychological theories and models of preference change will 
ultimately help sort out good results from those that turn out merely to be good tries. 
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